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Abstract
This paper presents astudy of the quality of service provision problem in noncooperative network
environments where applications or users are assumed to behave in a selfish way. Our contributions
arc threefold.
First, we formulate a model of QoS provision in noncooperative network environments and
present a comprehensive game-theoretic analysis of its properties. We give a complete characteri-
zation of Nash equilibria and show under what conditions they arc system optimal. We show that,
in general, Nash equilibria need not be system optimal nor Pareto, and gaps exist to separate the
three classes in nontrivial ways. However, for "resource-plentiful" systems, we show that Nash
equilibria, Pareto optima, and system optima all coincide, collapsing into a single class.
Second, we investigate the problem of facilitating effective quality of service provision in systems
with multi-dimensional QoS vectors containing both mean- and variance-related QoS measures. We
extend the game-theoretic analysis to multi-dimensional QoS vector games and show under what
conditions the aforementioned results transfer over. We also investigate the effect of multiple QoS
measures on the properties of the induced QoS levels rendered by service classes. We show that
under bursty traffic conditions, it is impossible for a service class to deliver superior QoS in both
mean delay and jitter if weighted fair qucueing or other GPS-rclated packet schcduling disciplinc
is used.
Third, whereas parts one and two dealt with questions concerning properties of system states
as determined by the interaction of selfish applications or users, the third part investigates what
the system can do to enhance network QoS provision performance. We present an adaptive ser-
vice weight control algorithm for GPS-based switches and show its effectiveness at equilibriating
imbalances between service class utilizations. We show that total utility can be improved without
adversely affecting individual applications-a form of Pareto optimization.
Keywords: Mufticlass QoS Provi.sion, Noncooperative Network Game, Distributed Network Al-




With the increased deployment of high-speed local- and wide-area networks carrying a multitude of
information from e-mail to bulk data to voke and video, provisioning adequate quality of service (QoS)
to the diverse application base has become an important problem [2, 10, 24, 29]. This paper describes
a QoS provision architecture suited for best-effort environments, based on ideas from microeconomics
and noncooperative game theory. We construct a noncooperative QoS provision model where users
are assumed to be selfish, and packets are routed over switches where, as a function of their enscribed
priority, diITerentiated service is delivered. Quality of service is an induced phenomenon, achieved as
a result of interaction between selfish applications.
The traditional approach to QoS provision uses resource reservations along a route to be followed
by a traffic stream so that the stream's burstiness can be suitably accommodated. Although research
abounds [5, 6, 9, 10, 15, 25, 29, 30, 31, 7], analytic tools for computing QoS guarantees rely on
shaping input traffic, to preserve well-behavedness across switches which implement some form of
packet scheduling discipline [8,30] such as GPSI However, real-time constraints of multi-media traffic
and the scale-invariant burstiness associated with self-similar network traffic [26, 36, 46, 32] limit the
shapability of input traffic while at the same time reserving bandwidth that is significantly smaller
than the peak transmission rate. Thus QoS and utilization stand in a trade-off relationship with each
other [33, 32] and transporting application traffic over reserved channels, in general, incurs a high cost.
Tills makes it important to organize today's best-effort bandwidth into stratified services with graded
QoS properties such that the QoS requirements of a a compendium of applications can be effectively
met; particularly applications with diverse but-to varying degrees-tolerant QoS requirements. Tills,
additionally, helps amortize the cost of inefficiencies stemming from overprovisioned resources for
guaranteed traffic through the filling-in effect [22].
Recently, microeconomic approaches to resource allocation have received significant interest with
applications spanning a number of diverse contexts [12, 40, 19, 18, 21, 23, 13, 43, 44, 27, 4, 39, 16,
35]' The overall goal of this area is to formulate a resource allocation problem in the framework
of mlcroeconomics and game theory, and show that under certain conditions, the system achieves
"desirable" allocations both from a stabilibity and optimality point-of-view. The latter are important
in making stratified best-effort bandwidth usable by multi-media applications. This is because a
neccessary system property in tills case is a predictable level of service both in terms of stability as
well as in meeting the QoS requirements of the application. The models and approaches differ along
several dimensions, some of the important ones being whether applications or users are assumed to
be cooperative or selfish, whether pricing is used or not, and how much computing responsibility is
delegated to the user. Several papers have addressed the issue of multi-class QoS provision in hlgh-
speed networks [4, 19, 28, 40, 39, 35]. Some of the works employ a cooperative framework or place
significant computing responsibilities on the part of the user [28, 39], some investigate the effect of
pricing incentives [4], and others represent How or congestion control models that only partially address
'Also known as weighted fair queueing.
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the quality of service problem problem [19, 40J.
The present approach differs from previous works in two significant ways-first, it is one of the
most comprehensive noncooperative resource allocation models specifically formulated to model QoS
provision, and second, we address both theoretical and practical aspects, with emphasis on bridging the
gap from theory to realizability. Not only do we study the noncooperative QoS provision model from a
game-theoretic perspective showing the existence of a rich structure relating Nash equilibria to Pareto
and system optima, we also investigate the problem of facilitating adequate services when the model
is extended to incorporate multi-dimensional QoS vectors with possibly conflicting requirements, the
effect of burstiness on rendered QoS, and the adaptive relocation of network resources to hot spots
using programmable GPS switches. The specific contributions are described next.
1.2 Summary of Results
Our contributions are threefold:
Game-theoretic From a game-theoretic perspective, we formulate a model of multiclass QoS pro-
vision in noncooperative network environments and analyze the structure of the system with respect
to its equilibria and optima. Before we state the results, three notions arc of import for their under-
standing (defined formally in Section 2.3): Nash equilibrium, Pareto optimum, and system optimum.
Roughly speaking, a configuration is a Nash equilibrium if each player cannot improve its individual
lot through unilateral adions affecting its traffic allocations. Thus if every player finds herself in such
a "local optimum," then from the noncooperative perspective, the system is at an ~mpasse-l.e.,stable
rest point. A configuration is a Pareto optimum if in order to improve the lot of any player(s), the
lot of others must be sacrificed. A configuration is system optimal if the sum of the individual lots is
maximized.
First, we give a complete characterization of Nash equilibria and show under what conditions Lhey
are system optimal (Theorems 3.4 and 3.6). The latter is shown to be related to the Pareto optimality
of a certain normal form (Lemma 3.5) derived from Nash equilibria which points to an interesting
relationship between Nash equilibria, Pareto optima, and system optima for the QoS provision game.
Figure 1.1 depicts a typical picture of the structure of the network QoS provision game, annotated by





Figure 1.1: Structure of network QoS provision game.
Second, we show that there are Nash equilibria that are Pareto but not system optimal (Proposi-
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tion 3.7)-this shows that Theorem 3.6 is "tight." We also show that there exist Nash equilibria that
are not Pareto optimal and vice versa, and for some games in this framework, no Nash equilibria exist
at all (Proposition 3.8).
Third, we show that for certain "resource-plentiful" systems, Nash equilibria, Pareto optima, and
system optimal all conincide collapsing into a single class (Theorem 3.13, part (a)). This item is
interesting from the perspective that it gives a sufficient condition under which Nash equilibria are
guaranteed to be also desirable in the optimality sense. In part (b) of the same theorem, we show
that a certain self-optimization procedure leads to quick, robust convergence to globally optimal Nash
equilibria.
Multi-dimensional QoS Vectors We investigate the problem of effectively facilitating quality of
service provision in systems with multi-dimensional QoS vectors containing both mean- and variance-
related measures (e.g., bounds on packet loss rate, delay, and jitter).
First, we extend the game-theoretic analysis to multi-dimensional QoS vector games and show that
the main results carryover if a uniformity assumption is placed either on application preference or on
QoS vector functions (Propositions 4.4 and 4.5).
Second, from a performance perspective, we investigate the impact of multiple QoS measures-
sometimes with contradictory requirements imposed by user requirements---on the characteristics of
QoS levels rendered by the service classes. In particular, we show the surpising result that under
bursty traffic conditions, it is impossible for a service class to deliver superior QoS in both mean·
and variance-related QoS measures (e.g., mean delay and jitter) vis-a.-vis some other service class, if
weighted fair queueing or other GPS-related packet scheduling discipline is used. Under weakly bursty
traffic conditions, a total ordering among service classes is possible, however, via the degenerate
situation where the "superior" service classes attain zero packet loss. For mean-related QoS measures
such as mean packet loss rate and delay, we show that total orderings among service classes are feasibly
achievable.
Structural Adaptation Whereas the results from the previous two parts dealt with questions
concerning properties of system states as determined by the interaction of selfish applications or users,
the third part investigates the question of what the system-if anything-can do to enhance network
QoS provision performance. We show that in systems where resources are taxed, instabilities can arise
which can adversely affect the predictability property required of service classes. IT utilization across
service classes is uniformly high, then the problem is intrinsic and nothing can be done by the system
short of shedding load through admission control or the induced departure of applications through
price control.
However, we show that this problem can arise even in situations where there exist imbalances
between utilizations across service classes which opens the way for the system to positively affect QoS
provision performance. We formulate an adaptive service weight control algorithm in the context of
systems implementing weighted fair queueing at routers where imbalances between service class uti-
lizations are reduced iteratively. We show that the control algorithm is effective at reducing imbalances
and improving total system performance by shifting idle resources from applications that don't need
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them to those that do-a form of Pareto optimization. The algorithm possesses an interesting twist
due to the fact that burstiness causes variance-related QoS measures to be affected in the opposite
direction from mean-related QoS measures (Section 4.2.2).
1.3 Related Work
Microeconomic Approaches to Resource Allocation In recent years, there has been a surge of
work in "microeconomic approaches to resource allocation" where ideas and tools from microeconomics
and game theory have been applied in the formulation and solution of problems arising in flow control,
routing, file aUocation, load balancing, multi-commodity fiow, and quality of service provision, among
others [12, 40, 19, 18, 21, 23,13,43,44,27,4,39,35]. A collection of papers covering a broad range of
topics can be found in [3]. A brief survey of some of the literature is provided in [11]_ Some standard
references to game theory and microeconomics include [14,38,41,42].
Many of the earlier papers including some recent ones [13, 12, 23, 28, 39] have espounded a
cooperative game theory framework to model user interactions and derive results based on Pareto
optimality. Although fruitful to investigate due to the powerful tools available in cooperative game
theory, a potential drawback of this line of approach is the assumption that users or applications
behave coopemtively in networking contexts. For the long-term establishment of virtual circuits or
the leasing of telephone lines, the cooperative user model may indeed be viable2 . However, for best-
effort applications that comprise much of today's Internet traffic, users are largely anonymous with
respect to thousands of other users who concurrently share network resources at any given time, and
a noncooperative framework where each user is assumed to optimize individual performance based on
his or her limited available information about network state seems better suited.
The noncooperative framework can be traced as far back as '81 to a paper by Yemini [47] who
has since been more strongly associated with the cooperative approach where his work has played a
seminal role. The noncooperative network resource allocation approach has been actively pursued by
Lazar and his co-workers beginning in the late '80s [17, 1] with more recent work carried out jointly
with Korilis and Orda [18, 19, 20, 21]. Their main work has revolved around an optimal flow control
problem, and the development of techniques needed to show the existence of Nash equilibria using the
notion of best reply correspondence [19]. Korilis et aI. [20, 21] have also looked at the problem of using
interventions by an impartial external entity-the network manager-to steer the system toward Nash
equilibria that are also system optimal using the framework of Stackelberg games.
Another significant thrust in noncooperative network games is due to recent work by Shenker [40]
where it is shown how choosing a packet scheduling discipline can influence the nature of the Nash
equilibria attained. In the context of a congestion or flow control model, it is shown that for a large
class of packet scheduling disciplines, a configuration being Nash need not imply that it is Pareto
optimal. A GPS-related service discipline called Fair Share is defined and it is shown to lead to Nash
equilibria with desirable properties including uniqueness and reachability by a class of self-optimization
procedures.
2H is also possible that intermediaries perform long-term leasing of network resources which are then packaged and
made available as high-level services to the user. Aspects of such activities may be modeled as coalition behavior.
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On the implementation side, the work of Waldspurger et aI. [43] deserves attention since it is one
of the few works that have built a nontrivial working system-CPU allocation and load balancing in
workstation networks-and demonstrated that a system based on microeconomic principles can indeed
work in practice. Other implementations worth noting include Wellman's work on multicommodity
flow problems [401,45].
QoS-Related Network Games Several papers have addressed the more specific issue of multi-
class QoS provision in high-speed networks using microeconomic models [4, 28, 39, 16]. In [28, 39],
utility functions are defined with link bandwidth and switch buffers acting as substitutable resources,
and Pareto-optimal allocation of resources among service classes is affected either by the network
exercising admission control [39] or by users performing purchasing decisions [28]. In both approaches,
it is assumed that QoS guarantees are computable, given specific resource reservations.
As stated earlier, an important goal of our approach is to use a noncooperative framework and
shield the user from having to make complex computations to estimate service quality. The models
and approaches arc thus clearly dissimilar.
In [4], a general framework for investigating pricing in networks is proposed, with service discipline
and pricing policy acting as design variables. Simulation results are shown that depict the existence
of "desirable" price ranges related to system optimality. The simulations were carried out using
a 2-service class packet scheduling algorithm where a shared FIFO queue was partitioned into two
segments with high priority packets being queued at the front and low priority packets being queued
at the back. Four types of applications with different QoS requirements were tested with priority
settings either set to 1 or 2.
Our model is an n-application, m-service class, s-dimensional QoS vector quality service provision
model, and emphasizes a different set of questions from [4] where the effect of pricing incentives are
paramount. We apply noncooperative game-theoretic analysis to the multi-dimensional QoS vector
model to understand under what conditions Nash equilibria exist and are system or Pareto optimal.
We also investigate the problem of facilitating service classes with induced QoS levels that match
application requirements when multiple QoS indicators are present.
Comparison with Models by Korilis et al. and Shenker The flow or congestion control models
of Korilis et al. [19] and Shenker [40] represent a form of quality of service provision and it is important
to explicate the differences between our model and theirs, given that all three follow the noncooperative
framework. The main difference between the models by Korilis et al. and Shenker, and Park et al.
is that, indeed, theirs is a flow or congestion control model. Phrased in the language of the QoS
provision model defined in Section 2.3, both [19] and [40] correspond to the situation where n = m,
each player i is permanently assigned to service class i, and either Aii ~ 0 [40] or 0 ~ Aii :s: Ai [19J,
but in both cases, Aij = 0 for i :f j. That is, a player, being tied to a fixed service class, has the
option of controlling how much traffic [40]-or using what time schedule [19J-to send his traffic but
not where. Since delay or any other performance measure will deteriorate with increased volume but
volume itself, keeping other things fixed, will generally increase utility, there is an optimum volume
assignment-i.e., optimal flow or congestion control-that maximizes player i's utility.
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In our model, there is no 1-1 correspondence of players to service classes. Indeed, the very crux of
the QoS provision problem is to give each player i E [1, n] the freedom to choose where she wants to send
her traffic volume, from service class 1 aU the way to service class m. Hence, our QoS provision model
is fundamentally different from their flow control models, being more complex and producing equilibria
structures that are different from [19], [40]. Secondly, our model incorporates multi-dimensional QoS
vectors whose consequences are then analyzed in both game-theoretic and network performance terms.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the overall set-up and
formulate the network QoS provision model. This is followed by Section 3 which gives a game-
theoretic analysis of the QoS provision game structure. Section 4.1 extends the game-theoretic analysis
to multi-dimensional QoS vectors and Section 4.2 studies the effect of burstiness on the characteristics
of rendered QoS. Lastly, Section 5 investigates the problem of structural adaptation using a service
weight control algorithm. We conclude with a discussion of our results and future work.
2 Noncooperative Network Game
2.1 Network Model
The network model is depicted in Figure 2.1. A switch or router is shared by two traffic classes-
rese7iJed and nonreserved (or best-effort)-where the former constitutes background or cross traffic
and the latter is the aggregate application traffic. That is, )..NR = L:~:::l)..i where )..1, )..2, ... ,)..n are
the mean arrival rate of n application traffic sources. The service rate of the system is given by J-L
and we will assume that the switch implements a form of weighted fair queueing (WFQ) with service
weights a}, a2, ... , am where aj :2: 0, j E [1, m], and Ej:::10'.j = 1. Here, m denotes the number of
service classes. The total service rate J-L is split between the two traffic classes J-L = J-LR + J-LNR. Service
class j of the nonreserved traffic class thus receives a service rate of O'.jJ-LNR.
RI!$I!M!d
TraffIC
Figure 2.1: Dual traffic classification at output-buffered switch with shared priority queue implement-
ing weighted fair queueing.
In keeping with the ATM framework, we assume fixed-size packets (Le., cells) and we employ
output-buffered switches. We implement a generic form of weighted fair queueing achieving perfect
isolatedness and conservation of work. We ignore effient implementation considerations of WFQ,
treating the processing cost at switches as fixed. The tUisumption of fixed-size packets simplifies the
faithful rendering of service rates commensurate with the weights 0'.1, ... , am.
G
2.2 Application Model
Utility Function Given a generic network model where packets are tagged by priorlty labels receiv-
ing differentiated service at switches, we need a framework and control mechanism which is able to
exploit tills feature to provide service to applications with diverse QoS needs such that the collective
good of the whole system is maximized. A utility function is a map U : IRs --+ R+. s ~ 1, from QoS
vectors to the nonnegative Teals indicating the level of satisfaction or utility a certain quality of service
brings to an application DT user. It is a purely theoretical tool to reason about application behav-
ior assuming certain qualitative shapes about its preferences. Figure 2.2 shows two candidate utility
functions, on the left, for "nonurgcnt" e-mail, and on the right, for a real-time video application. The










Figure 2.2: Utility functions. E-mail application (left) and video application (right).
The shapes of the utility functions indicate that non-urgent e-mail is much more tolerant to high
packet loss, and unless the loss rate is "exceedingly" high, the e-mail application is almost equally
satisfied whether the loss rate is 0 or somewhat higher. The video application, on the other hand, can
only tolerate much smaller loss rates, and its utility is concentrated toward O.
Selfishness Selfishness, in our context, will mean that each application i E [1, n] will try to take
actions so as to maximize its individual utility Ui. The forms for Ui as well as user i's decision variables
for the QoS provision problem are defined in the next section.
2.3 Definition of Network QoS Provision Game
QoS Provision Problem Assume we are given m service classes and n applications or players
represented by their mean arrival rates At, ... ,An and utility functions Ut , ... ,Un' We arrive at a
resource allocation problem in the following way. Let Aij 2:: 0, i E [1, n], j E [1, m], denote the traffic
volume of the i'th application assigned to service class j. Thus, Ai = :2::;=t Aij. That is, application
i is given the freedom to choose which service classes to assign her traffic to. We also consider the
special case when traffic assignments are restricted to be "all in one bag," i.e., Aij E {Ai,O}, for all
j E [I,m].
Let A = (A;j: i,j) denote the resource assignment matrix, and let CI,C2, ... ,Cm be the packet
loss rates of the m service classes. Each packet loss rate is a function of A,
c - c ·(A)) - J ,
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j E [l,ml.
Assuming isolatedness3, we have Cj = Cj(qj) where qj = 2:?=1 Aij is the total traffic volume assigned
to class j. We will also make the assumption that Cj is monotone in qj, i.e., dCjfdqj ~ 0, a property
satisfied by virtually all service disciplines of interest. Isolatedness and monotonicity will be the
only two properties needed of a packet scheduling discipline. We will also make the assumption that
dU;jdc::; o. That is, making the packet loss rate smaller<1 can never decrease the utility experience by
player i.
The model can be extended to the case when application QoS requirements are represented by
multi-dimensional QoS vectors x E R 5 , S ~ 1. For example, in addition to packet loss rate, x may
specify delay requirements as well as restrictions on their fluctuations such as jitter. It turns out that
the analysis of the multi-dimensional case reduces to the scalar case under certain conditions, and we
will proceed with packet loss rate C as the sole QoS indicator.




Subject to the above constraints, the static optimization problem can be formulated as
n
max U(A) ~ L; U;(A).
A .,=1
This is a nonlinear programming problem with equality constraints.
(2.1)
Nash Equilibria, Pareto Optima, and System Optima Any A" that satisfies (2.1) is called
system optimal. Thus system optimality corresponds to optimizing the usual resource allocation
objective function. An assignment A" is Pareto optimal if for all A,
Vi, U;(A")':; U;(A) = Vi, U;(A") = U;(A).
That is, Pareto optimality states that total utility (J can only be improved at the expense of one
or more individual utility OJ. In general, Pareto optimality does not imply system optimality. But,
clearly, A is system optimal implies A is Pareto optimal.
The formulation of Nash equilibrium needs a further definition. Given A, let Ai
(Ail, A;2' ... ,Aim) denote the i'th player's assignment vector. Ai is also called the stmtegy of player i.
Let
where IIxlh = ET=l IXj!. That is, .c;(A) is the set of all unilateml strategies for player i.
An assignment A" is a Nash equilibrium if Vi E [1, n], VA E .c;(A"),
U;(A)':; U;(A").
3 Also called insularity or firewall properly.
"-An analogous assumption is made in the multi-dimensional QoS vector case.
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That is, in a Nash equilibrium, player i cannot improve its individual utility Ui by unilaterally changing
its strategy.
In general, a system optimal assignment need not be a Nash equilibrium and little can be said
about the relation between system optimality, Pareto optimality, and Nash equilibria. In the context
of the noncooperative network environment where every player acts selfishly, we are interested in
characterizing assignments that are Nash since they represent stable fixed points of the system-i.e.,
equilibria. From a resource allocation perspective, we would also like to know under what conditions
Nash equilibria are system optimal.
Simplifying Assumption To make the analysis tractable, we will work with (unit) step utility
Junctions where for each player i E [1, nJ,
U,(o) = {j,
0,
if c :::; Oi,
otherwise,
where OJ ;:::: 0 is a threshold that represents the i'th application's preference. Since Cj
j E [1, m], there exist bij ~ 0 such that
U,(oj(qj)) = {j,
0,
if qj :::; bij,
otherwise.
With a slight abuse of notation, we will sometimes write U;(qj) for the composite function when the
distinction is clear from the context.
The simplification is reasonable from two perspectives. One, from the technical side, we do not lose
very much by sacrificing continuity of the utility functions, since it turns out that our game produces
total utility functions which are not necessarily quasi-concave in player i'th decision variable even
though the compactness and convexity conditions for the i'th player's strategy set are satisfied. That
is, even though we start out with quasi-concave utility functions5 , the individual utility function Ui
need not be so. Hence, Rosen's theorem [37], which is a standard tool for showing the existence of
Nash equilibria, would not he usable even if the utility funtions were continuous in the framework of
our QoS provision game.
We should qualify that the above statements are referred to in the context of a simplified game
where m::: 1 and 0 :::; >'i1 ::; >'i. Notice that, then,
Since Ui, c1 are both monotone (with different signs), it follows that Ui is monotone in q1 with
dU;jdqj :::; o. It is not difficult to show that Ui(A) can be made to be bimodal, hence not quasi-
concave, if Ui-still monotone and continuous-is chosen to have a "terrace-like" shape. Indeed, going
back to our QoS provision game, we can show that for some instances of the game, no Nash equilibria
whatsoever exist (Proposition 3.8).
Two, we find that threshold functions, in many instances, adequately model the way best-effort
applications might interact with the network in making their QoS requirements known-i.e., through
5Note that monotonicity trivially implies quasi-concavity.
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the specification of bounds on mean packet loss rate, delay, and their variances (i.e., jitter). The
analysis of the simplified QoS provision game remains highly nontrivial, and as we shall see, the game
retains a rich structure.
3 Properties of Noncooperative QoS Provision Game
3.1 Equilibria and Their Properties
This section will investigate the structure of the QoS provIsion game leading to the relationship
depicted in Figure 1.1. Let us impose a total order on the n players given by
Unless otherwise stated, we will assume such a fixed order in the following development. First, a
simple fact on the induced ordering of the traffic volume thresholds bij.
Proposition 3.1 Vi E [I,n-I], Vj E [I,m], bij":; bi+tj.
Proof. Since 9i ..:; 9i+!, i E [1, n - 1], by monotonicity of Cj, j E [1, mj,
cjl (9;) ..:; cjl(9i+l).
Noting that bij = cjl(8;) completes the proof. •
Let rt = {j E [I,m], qj > b;j, Aij > oj, Ii- = {j E [I,m], qj < bij }, and Ii' = {j E [I,m],
qj = bij}. Given player i, It denotes the set of relevant service class indices where the traffic volume
assigned exceeds player i's threshold, thus yielding 0 individual utility. Conversely for I i- and J? Let
q} = Lk;l!:i Akj' Hence qj = Aij + q}. That is, qj is the traffic volume assigned to service class j not
counting player i's contribution (if any).
Let .It = {j E [1, mj : q~ ~ bij} and Ji = {j E [1, m] : q} < bij}. Hence Jt is the set of
service class indices where, irrespective of player i's actions, player i cannot garner any utility. Let
Jt = {j E [1, mj : bij - qj = minkEr bik - qi}. Ji takes on a role similar to Jt when the latter is,
empty.
The next two propositions give uniform upper bounds on the individual utility of a fixed player
where uniformity is with respect to all unilateral strategy changes by the player.
Proposition 3.2 Given A, i E [1, n]' let Vi = LjEJ
j
- bij - q}. Then
VA' E L;(A), Ui(A') ~ V;_
Proof. Since for all j E Jt, U,.(cj(A')) = 0, the upper bound Vi follows immediately.
Proposition 3.3 Given A, i E [1, n], let Ai > Vi and Jt = 0. Then 3j'" E Ji such that
VA' E Li(A), Ui(A') ~ Vi - (b;j' - qj.).
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•
Proof. First, Jt f:. 0 since Ji- =f 0. Since .Ai > vi and Jt = 0, for at least one j E Ji-, qj > bij . This
implies that Ui(cj(N)) = O. It is easily checked that
max Ui(N)
A'eCi(A)
is achieved by N such that Ail =bil- q~ if £ ::f:. j", and Aij. = Ai - L:l#j• .A~l' where j" is some element
in Ji. Hence, U,(A') = L:l;ej. bil - q~ = Vi - (bij· - q}.). •
The next result is the nrst of the two main theorems giving a complete characterization of when
an allocation is Nash. For each player, one of three conditions must hold: a player either achieves
full individual utility Ai, or partial utility Vi = L:jeJ:"" bij - q} dumping the excess traffic .Ai - vi into
one or more service classes belonging to Jt, or parti~ utility Vi - (bij • - q}.) with excess traffic being
assigned to one of the service classes in Ji.
Theorem 3.4 (Nash Characterization) A is a Nash equilibrium iff Vi E [1, n] either
(a) It=0,or
(b) Ii- = 0, Jt =f 0, Ji ~ IP, or
(c) 1,- ~ 0, Jt = 0, 3j" E Ji such that J,- \ {jO} <;!?
Proof. ({::::). Assume It = 0 (part (a)). Since Vj, .Ai; > 0~ qj $. bij, we have tJ.(A) = Ai, the
trivial upper bound on tJj •
Assume (b) holds. By Proposition 3.2, U;(A)'::; Vi where Vi = L:jeJ:"" bij -q}. I i- = 0 and J i- ~ I?
imply Ui(A) = Vi, thus achieving the upper bound which holds for an~ A' E £i(A). Notice that Jt,
J.- do not depend on the actions of player i.
Assume part(c). 1;- = 0 and 3 j* E Ji such that Ji- \ {j"'} ~ If imply that tJi(A) ;::: Vi- (bij· - q}.).
IT J; = 0, which holds iff J i- = 0, then we are done. Assume Ji ::f:. 0. Notice that the case r: ~ I?
is covered by part (b) or (a). Hence, we can assume j" E It- I j- = 0 and j- E It imply that
Vi < Ai. Thus, we can apply Proposition 3.3 which in conjunction with the lower bound on Ui(A)
yields U,(A) = v, - (b,;o - qj.).
( =». We will prove the contrapositive. That is, assuming 3 i E [1, n], given A, such that
It # 0 A (Ii # 0 V Jt = 0 V Ji rt!?)
A (1,- # 0 V Jt # 0 V If)" Eli : J,- \ {j"} rt IPl,
we will show that A is not Nash. There are nine clauses to be considered which are grouped into nve
cam (i)-(v).
(i) (I,+ # 0AI,- # 0), (It # 0 A I i- # 0 A Jt = 0), (It # 0AIi- # 0 A Ji- rt I;'), (It # 0A I i- #
01\Jt::f:. 0), (It::f:. 0/\Ii-::f:. 01\"Ij* E Ji: Ji- \{j*} i If). They all have in common the conjunction
It ::f:. 0/\ I i- ::f:. 0. The latter implies 3j, i', j::f:. i', such that Aij > 0, qj > bij, and qj' < bii'-
We can construct an assignment A' E £j(A) such that A~t = Ail, eE [1, m]\{j,i'}' and Aij = Aij-f,
A~j' = AW +c, where f = min{>.ij, bij' - qj'}. This yields
Ui(A') - U,(A) ~ ,
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from which it follows that A is not a Nash equilibrium. It can be easily checked that the argument
applies to the other four clauses.
(ii) (I;f" f:. 0AJt = 0A Jt f 0) = F. The implication reduces to a tautology.
(iii) (Ii i' 0/\ Ji rt I? /\ Ji i' 0). Ji rt Ii' implies that Ji i' 0. Fm j E Ji \ Ip, either qj < b;j
or qj > bij. If qj < bij, then the argument from (i) can be applied. Assume qj > bij. This implies that
U;(ej(A)) ~ O. Since Ji i' 0, fm all j' E Ji, j' i' j and U;(cj'(A)) = O.
We can construct A' E Li(A) such that >'il = >'il, I!. E [1, m] \ {j, i'}' and >.ij = >'ij - C, >'~j' = >'ij' +E,
where E = qj - bij . We still have Ui(cj'(A/» = 0, however,
U;(Cj(A')) = bij - qj > 0
since j E J,~ and qj = hij. Hence A is not Nash.
(iv) (Ii i' 0/\ Ji = 0/\ 'Ii" E Ji ' J;- \ {j") rt 1)'). Ji = 0 implies J;- i' 0, Ji i' 0. In fact,
lJi-r ~ 2. This follows from Vj" E Ji : Ji \ {j.} <I:. I? since Ji ~ Ji-, and assuming IJi-1 < 2 would
imply J;- \ {j") = 0 which would violate J;- \ {j") rt If.
Let j E Ji-, i' E Ji I with j f:. j'. If qj < bij, then the argument from (i) applies and we are done.
Similarly for j'. Let qj > bij. If IItl ~ 2, then we can choose j" E It with j f j/l and apply the
argument in (ill) w1th It in place of Jt· Assume lIt] = 1, 1.e., It = {j}. We need only consider the
case qj' = bijJ. Notice that J j- \Jt i- 0 since, if Jj- = Ji then J i- \ {j} ~ I? by lIt] = 1, which would
contradict the assumpt10n Vj· E J;- : J i- \ {j"} <I:. I?
Construct the assignment A' E L;(A) such that >'il = >'il, £ E [I,m] \ {j,j'}, and >'~j = >'ij - c,
>'ij , = >';i' + E, where (= qj - bjj . Now, Ui(cj'(A/» = 0 but Uj(cj(N» = bij - qj. Since j E Jj- \ Ji
and )./ E r
"
which implies U;(N) - Ui(A) > O.
(v) (Ii i' 0/\ J;- rt Ip /\ Vj" E Ji ' J;- \ {j") rt 1)').
needed to establish J; f:. 0 which we can get from J; <I:. I?
unchanged.
In the proof of (1v), Jt = 0 was only
Hence the argument of (iv) carries over
•
The next lemma gives a useful property of Nash equilibria which is used in the proof of Theorem 3.6.
For a Nash equilibrium A, an equivalent assignment A' (not neccessarily Nash) can be found with the
same total utility so that the players can be partitioned into two sets around a unique, dividing player
iAJ. The first set consists of players with indices larger than il\' with respect to the ordering induced
by Proposition 3.1, with all players having full utility. The second set consists of players with smaller
indices than if\J, all of them having zero utility. The third set is the singleton set {il\'} consisting of
the dividing player who has partial utility. We will call such an assignment A' a normal form of A.
Lemma 3.5 (Normal Form) Let A be a Nash equilib,ium with U(A) < :2::;=1 >'i. Let iA=: max{i:
U,(A) < A;). Then 3A' with U(A') = U(A) such that
(a) Vi < iA " Ui(A') = 0, and
(b) Vi> i A" Ui(A') = Ai.
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Proof. Let Sill = {i E [1, n] : i < iA• fJi(A) f:. O}. By the definition of iA, for all i > iA, fJi(A) = Ai,
which gives (b). If Sill = 0, then we are done.
Assume Sill f:. 0. We will construct as assignment A' from A such that it satisfies property (a)
while preserving (b). Notice that by Theorem 3.4 and AiA> UiA(A), qj :;:: billj for all j E [I,m]. Also,
by Proposition 3.1, biAj ~ bij for all i E SiA. Let
To achieve (a), we will distribute the excess utility Jr into service classes j with qj > OiAj thus
nullifying their contribution. To avoid otherwise disturbing the utility assignment, we will move a
commensurate amount from v, exactLy filling the gap left by Jr. That is, qj = qj, j E [1, m], in
the modified assignment A'. If v > 7'i, the reassignment can be achieved in one round. If v S; ii", a
relined construction is used that iteratively shrinks the violating player set SiA until it becomes empty.
Following is a formal description of the construction.
Case (i). Assume v > 71. Let J(- = {j E [I,m]: qj = bij, Aij > 0, i E SiA}, J(+ = {j E [I,m]:
qj > biA), AiAj > O}. We construct A' as follows. For i E SiA, j E J(-,
A~Aj = AiAj + L Akj.
kESiA
A~Aj = AiAj - L (kj,
kESiA
where (ij ~ 0, LkESiA (kj ::; AiAj, and LiESiA,jEK+ (ij = 1[". For all other i and j, A~j = Aij.
By construction, qj = qj for j E [1, m), and since the excess utility Jr has been transferred into
service classes belonging to J(+, we have Ui(A') = 0 for i E S;A' Hence, if,! = iA. Also, notice that
since player iA'S unutilized traffic volume has been tranferred to service classes in 1(- where, by
Proposition 3.1, they now count.
Case (ii). Assume v ::; Jr. We will perform a similar switch as in case (i), however, over (possi-
bly) several rounds each time monotonically shrinking SiA and obtaining a new estimate for iA, by
decrementing the previous estimate.
In the first round, we transfer a traffic volume of v from players i E Si
A
with assignments in J(-
to service classes belonging to J(+. To preserve, qj = qj, j E [1, m], we transfer an equal amount from
player iA's assignments in J(+ to J(-. Tltis is possible since v ::; Jr. This yields
Thus, iA, .s iA - 1.
If SiAl = 0 then we are done. If SiA' f:. 0, we recursively repeat the switching process with iAI in
place of iA until S'AI = 0. Since the dividing player's index monotonically decreases by at least one in
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each round, the process terminates in at most i A - 1 rounds. •
Before stating and proving the second main theorem, we remark that the usefulness of the normal
form of a Nash equilibrium (itself not necessarily Nash) comes into play when checking for system opti-
mality of a Nash assignment. This is so since, as we shaU see, it is sufficient to check Pareto optimality
of the normal form to establish system optimality of the original Nash assignment. Moreover, a normal
form is easy to obtain from the original Nash configuration (construction in the proof of Lemma 3.5)
and checking for Pareto optimality is generally easier than checking for system optimality. The latter
is especially true in the case of normal forms where we can construct efficient decision procedures for
checking Pareto optimality.
Theorem 3.6 (Nash & System Optimal) Let A be a Nash equilibrium and let A' be its normal
form. Then A is system optimal iff A' is Pareto optimal.
Proof. Let N be the normal form constructed in the proof of Lemma 3.5. We will prove the following
statement from which the theorem follows immediately: A' is not system optimal iff there is a /t- with
U(A-) > U(N) such that
(a) Vi E [l,nl, U;(A") ~ U;(A'), and
(b) 3i $ i A , such that U;(A") > U;(N).
That is, A' is not Pareto optimal. Note that ti(A') = ti(A) by the definition of N.
The '<::' direction of the statement above is trivial. To show the '~' direction, we start with a A
with ti(A) > ti(A'), which exists since A' is not system optimal. For all i > iA" tii(N) = Ai, hence any
increase in the utility ti(1\.) over tJ(A') must come from one or more i :s; iA, for which Di(1\.) > tJi(A').
Indeed, ti;(A') = 0 for i < iA" hence (b) and part of condition (a), Le., Vi < iA" tii(A) ~ tJi(A'),
are aheady satisfied. We will construct A"' from A such that the remaining part of (a), i.e., Vi 2. iA"
Ui(1\.) 2. tJi(A'), is satisfied as well. Let
Clearly, L- n L+ = 0. Moreover, iA, need not be an element of either L- or L+. Let
IT = I: U;(A) - U;(A'),
ieL-
v = I: U;(N) - U;(;\).
ieL+
By V(A) > (j(A'), we have 7f - V > O. We can perform a switch in assignments between players in
L - and L+, similar to the proof of Lemma 3.5, obtaining an assignment A" which preserves qJ = iii,
j E (I,m], and which satisfies Vi E L+, V;(A"') = tii(A'), Vi E L-, tii(A*) ~ Gi(N), and for at least
one element i E L-, tJi(A") > tii(A').
Pick any two players L E L-, i+ E L+. Then, 3j_,j+ E [1, m], j_ ¥- j+, such that
b· . > q''_3_ - 3-
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The inequalities follow from Lemma 3.5, and i- f: i+ follows from the inequalities and bLj_ ~ bi+j+.
Let f. = min{Ai_j_,Ai+j+}. We can move an f. amount of L's assignment from j_ to i+, and
an equal amount of i+'s assignment from i+ to i-. Since bi_j_ ::; bi+j+, player i+'s utility strictly
increases by f. whereas player i_'s utility strictly decreases by the same amount. The other players'
utilities remain undisturbed since the total volume assignment to each service class was held invariant.
Since 7i - v > 0, this reassignment process can be repeated until a total traffic volume of v has
been shifted from players in L- to players in L+ and vice versa. Since Vi > iA " tlj(A') = Ai, by the
definition of v, we have that Vi > iA', Ui(A.*) = Ai, and thus Vi > iA', Ui(A'") :2:: Ui(N). For players
i < ill', Di(A'") ~ Di(N) remains satisfied since Ui(A/) = o.
The only consideration left is player iA'. If iA, rt L_ UL+, then we are done. If ill' E L_, then after
the switch operation, either Oif\,(A*) 2. Uif\,(N)-in which case we are done-or Uif\,(A*) < Uif\,(A').
In the latter, we may perform a further switch between player ill' and players i < iA , until iA,'s utility
has been suffiently increased vis-a.-vis Uif\,(N). This is possible since 7f - v > O. If iA , E L+, and
after the switch we still have Uif\,(A*) < U't.,(N), then the same process as with iA, E L_ can be done
yielding the desired ordering result. •
Given the form of Theorem 3.6, one may wonder whether all assignments that are Nash and
Pareto optimal are also system optimal. The next result gives a counterexample which shows that
Theorem 3.6 is "tight" in the sense that there are assignments that arc both Nash and Pareto optimal
but not system optimal.
Proposition 3.7 There exist Nash equilibria that are Pareto optimal but not system optimal.
Proof. The following describes a counter example consisting of a system of 3 players and 3 service
classes and an assignment A which is Nash and Pareto but not system optimal. As usual, using
Proposition 3.1, for each service class i, we can assume that b1j :$ b2j ::; b3j.
For service class 1, take bn = b21 , and b31 = bn + 1. For service class 2, take b12 = b22 = b32 = c
where e is a very small positive quantity. For service class 3, take b23 = b33 and b13 = s. Also, let
b32 < b31 < b33 ·
The assignment A. is defined as follows. The assignments to service class 1 are: ql = An = Al = bll ,
and >'21 = >'31 = o. The assignments to service class 2 are: q2 = >'22 = >'2 = b22 + E, where E is a
very large quantity and >'12 = >'32 = O. The assignments to service class 3 are: q3 = >'33 = b33 and
A13 = >'23 = O. This assignment A is clearly a Nash equilibrium: A22 = >'z is unutilized, but player 2
cannot unilaterally reassign its share to improve its utility. Players 1 and 3 have full utllity. Hence
the total utility for assignment A is >'3 +>'1.
This assignment A, however1 is not system optimal. The total utility can be increased using the
following changes to the assignment: the quantity >'1 can be moved to service class 2 from service class
1 so that the new >'11 is now 0, but the new >'2l is now equal to AI. A part of >'2 equivalent to the
quantity >'1 + 1 is moved into service class 3 so that service class 2 now has total volume q2 that is one
less than its previous value. Therefore >,Z is now partitioned into >'23 = >'1 + 1, with the remainder
of >'2 assigned to A23 while >'21 remains o. Finally, a part of >'3 equivalent to the quantity >'1 + 1 is
moved to service class 1 so the volume of service class 1 increases overall by 1 unit, and service class
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3 retains the same volume as before. Now },3 is partitioned into },31 = },1 + 1, with the remainder of
},3 assigned to },33 while },32 remains O.
The utility of player 3 remains the same as before, i.e., it has full utility },3. The utility of player
1 has decreased from },1 to 0 and the utility of player 2 has increased from 0 to },1 + L Hence the
total utility after completion of the above reassignment is '\1 +'\3 + 1 and hence it has increased by
1 overall which shows that the a."isignmcnt A is not system optimal. It is not hard to see that A is, in
fact, Pareto optimal; i.c. , for any a."isignment N that ha."i higher total utility, there must be at lea."it
one player, in particular, player 1, whose individual utility in A' is less than that in A. •
We remark that it is also not difficult to construct Nash equilibria which are not Pareto optimal.
In fact, the normal form of a Nash assignment A obtained from the construction in the proof of
Lemma 3.5 is typically itself Nash, and can be used to exhibit assignments that are Nash but not
Pareto. Thus, in general, gaps are present in all the important relations between assignments that are
Nash equilibria, Pareto optimal, or system optimal.
3.2 Dynamical Behavior of QoS Provision Game
Section 3.1 provides an equilibrium or static analysis of the network game, showing under what
condltions an a."isignment is Nash and when it is system optimal. In this section, we look at the
dynamlcal side, our interest being in the fate of time evolutions of the noncooperative network game
when starting from arbitrary initial configurations. Does every instance of the network game have
stable fixed points-i.e., Nash equilibria-to which to converge to? If so, are Nash equilibria reachable
from every initial configuration and when they do, what is the speed of convergence?
The following proposition answers the nrst of the questions in the negative. That is, we construct
a simple example which shows that for certain choices of },i, Ui, and Cj, (and, therefore, of b;,j), no
Nash equilibria exist.
Proposition 3.8 Consider the family of 2-player/2-service class systems such that the th1·esholds
b;j on lhe tOlallralJic volume of the service classes satisfy b\j < b2j, j = 1,2 (i.e., the ordering of
Proposition 3.1 is actually strid). Furthermore, assume the following inequalities hold:
(a) '\2 < bll +bl'l1
(b) A2 + AI> b'l1 + b'l'l > bll + b1'l ,
(c) },2 > max{bll ,bI2}.
Then, for such choices of },i, bjj , no Nash equilibrium exisls.
P1"Oof. To the contrary, assume A is a Nash equilibrium for the example described in the proposition.
Due to the first inequality satisfied by the ,\j'S and the bi/s, it follows that there is a service class
jl for which A2)1 = q}] < b1j j • Using tills observation and applying the Nash characterization from
Theorem 3.4 to the player 1, we obtain (without loss of generality, by the choice of )1)'
(3.9)
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Now, due to the second inequality (b) in the proposition, it follows that service class h f:. 11 has
assigned traffic volume
(3.10)
Furthermore, using (3.9) and the third inequality in the proposition,
(3.11)
Moreover, since blj < b2j, for all j, we know from (3.9) that AljI ~ % ~ blh < b2jl. Thus we get
(3.12)
Using (3.10), (3.11), and (3.12), and applying the Nash characterization from Theorem 3.4 to player
2, we get qjl ~ b2h which contradicts (3.9) since b1j < b2j , for all j. •
In contrast to the previous example, we now give a class of network games for which not only do
Nash equilibria always exist, Nash equilibria, Pareto optima, and system optima conincide. Moreover,
a "natural" dynamic process converges to Nash equilibria starting from arbitrary initial configurations.
First, the definition of the dynamic update process.
For present purposes, we define a dynamic update process P as follows. We assume that the players
move asynchronously, and at each step t, a single player it unilaterally and selfishly reassigns its Ai,
so that the new assignment At maxlmlzes its individual utility Ui,(A). We further assume that no
player moves unneccessarily-Le., a player only makes changes to its assignment if it thereby strictly
increases its individual utility.





then the following statements hold.
(a) A is a Nash equilibrium if and only if A is a system optimum if and only ifA is a Pareto optimum.
Moreover the optimum value achieved is U(A) = L: qi = L: Ai.
j ;
(b) Starting from any initial assignment Ao, the dynamic update process P converges to a Nash
equilibrium A. Moreover, A is aUained as soon as the sequence of players (i.e., moves) in the
process P includes the subsequence n, n - 1, ... ,1.
Proof. To show the first item above, it is sufficient to show that every Nash equilibrium A is system
optimal with utility U(A) = 1: Ai. The equivalence of Nash, Pareto, and system optima follows
immediately.
Due to the inequality in (3.14), for an assignment A, each player can always unilaterally reassign
its A;/S and strictly increase its own utility unless the following holds:
(3.15)
17
Thus A is a Nash equilibrium (Le., such a reassignment is impossible) only if (3.15) holds. But (3.15)
is equivalent to
ViVj: qj > bij => Aij = 0,
which, in turn, implies that A is system optimal.
Note that if (3.15) holds for A, then clearly no player contributes to any service class where the
contribution would be unutilized-Le., every player has complete utility and thus U(A) = L Ai. Hence
;
Nash, Pareto, and system optima are all equivalent.
To show that the process P converges to a Nash equilibrium starting from any initial configuration,
notice that
(1) When it is player i's turn to move, if Ui < Ai-the player has less than full utility-then it can
always unilaterally reassign its Ai;'S and achieve full utility. In other words, it can achieve the
status described in (3.15). Otherwise, if player i has full utility, it does not move at all, Le., it
keeps its current assignment.
(2) Once player i has moved, the subsequent moves of players with indices k < i will not affect i's
(full) utility. This is due to the inequality in Proposition 3.1, and because of the observation in
(1): the move of such a player k does not newly cause the traffic volume qj of any service class
to cross the threshold bkj :s; bij .
Thus, once player n has moved, it achieves full utility, and subsequent moves of the other players
does not affect its utility; hence player n never moves again. In general, once players n, n-l, .. _,n- k
have moved, in that order, the subsequent moves of the lower players 1, ... ,n - k - 1 do not affect
the (full) utility of the higher players n, n - 1, ... ,n - k, and hence they never move again. It follows
that a Nash equilibrium A is attained by the process P, starting from any initial assignment, as soon
as the sequence of players (i.e., moves) includes the subsequence n, n - 1, ... ,1. •
4 Multi-dimensional QoS Vectors
This section generalizes the QoS provision model to non-scalar QoS vectors. For example, a typical
QoS vector reflecting an application's quality of service requirement may include bounds on packet
loss rate, end-to-end delay, and their variances (e.g., jitter). We seek to answer two questions which
arise as a result of the extension.
First, do the game theoretic results of Section 2 carryover in the multi-dimensional QoS vector
case? Second, what is the effect of system variability-e.g., caused by fluctuating background or cross
traffic as well as overall system noise-on the rendered QoS of the service classes? In particular,
assuming that mean packet loss rate and its variance are components of the QoS vectors, is it possible,
under a weighted fair queueing packet scheduling policy, to induce service classes where one service
class delivers strictly better service than some other?
The first question is answered in the affirmative. With respect to the second question, we show
the surprising result that under "typical" operating conditions, achieving both lower mean packet loss
rate and variance is impossible.
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4.1 Extension of Game-theoretic Analysis
In Section 2, we formulated and analyzed a noncooperative QoS provision game based on singleton
QoS vectors, x = (c), where c was a bound on packet loss rate. Here, we will extend the model to
multi-dimensional QoS vectors x E IR:', S ~ 1, and show that, as far as Theorem 3.4 and Theorem 3.6
are concerned, the singleton vector analysis carries over unchanged.
Let x = (Xl, X2, . _ . ,xs?, and let xj = (x{, xt ... ,x~? denote the quality of service rendered
to service class j E [1, m]. As before, we make the monotonicity assumption dx~/dqj ~ 0, 7" E [1, S]'
j E [1, m], which is satisfied by most packet scheduling policies of interest including weighted fair




if 'iT E [1,5]' xr :::; 8~,
otherwise,
where (i = (8f, 8~, ... ,8~? ~ 0 is the multi-dimensional threshold vector that represents the i'th
application's preference.
In order to deal with the multi-dimensional QoS vectors and thresholds uniformly, we henceforth
make one of two uniformity assumptions: either assume that the thresholds 8~ can be ordered such
that the ordering is uniform over T, Le.,
VT E [1,5], Vi E [1 , nJ: 8~:::; 8~+l,
or we we assume that the functional forms x~ are uniform over T for each j, i.e.,
(4.1)
Vj E [1, m]: x{ = x~ = ... = x~. (4.2)
By isolatedness, x~ = xHqj), r E [1,5], j E [I,m], and just as in Proposition 3.1, the condition
xt(qj) :::; 8~ can now be stated as qj :::; bfj using the definition
b' - ( j)-I(O')ij - x r r .
Let bij be the minimum over T , i.e., bij = min rE[l,slbfj.






Moreover, under the assumption that the functional forms xt are uniform over T for each j where x~
satisfies Vj E [1, m], VT E [1, S], xt = x~, and using the monotoniclty of x!, it can be observed that the
following identity holds:
b;j = min (X!)-I(O;) =(x!r'( min 0;).
rED~ rE~~
That is, the min operator commutes with (:z:~)-1.




Proposition 4.4 For the multi-dimensional QoS vector model with assumption (4.1) or (4.2), there
exists an ordering of the players i E [1, n] such that Vi E [1, n - 11, Vj E [1, m],
Proof. We will consider both uniformity assumptions on the multi-dimensional QoS vectors and
thresholds simultaneously.
First, we consider the uniformity assumption (4.1) which states that the thresholds 8~ can be
ordered such that the ordering is uniform over T E [1,s]. Using this ordering and the monotonicity of
xt for each j E [1, m] and T E [1, s], by the definition ofthe bij, we can conclude that
'tiT E [1,s),Vj E [I,m],'tIiE [l,n-I], bij::; bi+lj'
Now for any fixed i, j, let r ' satisfy minrE[l,s] bij and let Til satisfy minrE[I,s] bi+1j" Clearly, bi;' ::; bi:lj,
Furthermore, bi; ::; bi;', since bij is minimized at T = T'. It therefore follows that the same ordering on
i also satisfies
min b':· < min b': ,.
IJ - ,+ JrE[I,s] rE[I,s)
from which the proposition follows immediately.
Next, we consider the uniformity assumption (4.2) which states that the functional forms x~ in
the QoS vector x j are uniform over T E [l,s] for each j E [I,m]. In this case, we can define a natural
ordering on i induced by
min 8~::; min 8~+l.
TE[I,s] rE[I,s]
Since the x~'s are all monotone, and as observed previously, bij = (x~)-I(.mlnrE[I,s]8~), this ordering
yields the required
which holds for all j E [1, m] and i E [1, n - 1].
Proposition 4.5 Theorem 3.4 and Theorem 3.6 hold for the the multi-dimensional QoS vector model
with assumption (4.1) or (4.2).
The proof structure of Theorem 3.4 and Theorem 3.6 only rely on Proposition 3.1 to capture
application QoS preferences. The QoS vectors (i.e., scalar packet loss indicator) and their functions
affect the proof only through Proposition 3.1. Thus, under either of the uniformity assumptions, and
with Proposition 4.4in hand, it is straightforward to check that the proofs carryover unchanged giving
Proposition 4.5.
4.2 Effect of Burstiness on Induced QoS
4.2.1 Problem Statement
A consequence of generalizing the QoS provision model to multi-dimensional QoS vectors without using
either of the uniformity assumptions of the previous section is that there may no longer be a total
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order on the set of application QoS requirements. That is, whereas in the scalar QoS case (e.g., take
packet loss rate), applications could be linearly ordered by the bounds on their packet loss rate,
i:OS; i' <=> O;:os; Oi"
in the vector QoS case, this is no longer the case and only a partial order can be imposed on the set
ofQoS requirements {81: i E [I,n]} where 8' = (8{,8~, ... ,8~)T.
Given that the QoS rendered by a service class j E [1, mJ is an induced phenomenon depending
on the total traffic influx qj to class j, the question arises how well the induced QoS levels match the
needs of the constituent application QoS requirements. This is a very broad question and part of it
(related to structural adaptation) is addressed in Section 5.
Here, we are interested in answering a very basic but important variant which makes one of the
uniformity assumptions of the previous section, and asks whether in a 2-application classf2-service
class/2"dlmensional QoS vector system with mean packet loss rate and its variance6 as the two QoS
indicators, an induced QoS assignment that is strictly ordered can be achieved if the application QoS
requirements are strictly ordered. That is, given
(4.6)
where (8~,8;) and (8;,8;) are the QoS requirements of application classes 1 and 2, respectively, with
8~ being a bound on the mean packet loss rate and 8~ being a bound on the standard deviation of the
packet loss rate, we seek to answer whether it is possible to achieve
(4.7)
where xl, x 2 are the actual QoS levels rendered by the two service classes, respectively.
4.2.2 Qualitative Analysis
Let (~(t))tER+ denote the stochastic process corresponding to the reserved cross traffic with mean
E(~) = AR. Here, E is the expectation operator. We will model reseroedness by assuming ~(t) $ }l-
and
~(t) = ~ - «t) (4.8)
where 17 is the available service rate to the nonreserved traffic class which is itself a stochastic process7 .
Since our goal is to ascertain the effect of the cross traffic ~(t) variance on the aforementioned strict
ordering of QoS provision question, we will treat the total service rate and the reserved traffic as fixed.
The packet loss rates of the rendered service class QoS vectors x j = (Cj,(lj), j = 1,2, can be
expressed as
c;(t) = maxi 1- ,,;~(t)/q;, o}.
60r , equivalently, mean end-to-end delay and its variance (i.e., jitter) which can be analyzed similarly.
7For present purposes, we may equivalently define Ij(t):;;; rna): { p. - €(t),O}.
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(4.9)
Here, we have used the isolatedness property of WFQ. Thus Cj(t) itself is a stochastic process and
o:S Cj(t) :S 1.
Note that the packet loss rate rendered by service class j is determined by its traffic volume qj and
therefore lts "relative goodness" vis-a-vis other service classes is determlned by the normalized weight
Wj = O'j /qj, j = 1,2. Since, by assumption, qj is fixed, we may assume without loss of generality that
That is, service class 1 is "better" than service class 2, certainly with respect to packet loss rate since
CI(t) ~ C2(t), Vt E IR+, which follows from (4.9). This also trivially implies
E(c,):s E(c,).
The variance, however, is more tricky. Let V denote the variance operator. Then
V(Cj) = ( p(~)(I- wj~)'d~ - E(cj)'
IT/<...!...
-Wj
since for "1 ~ 1/Wj, Cj = 1- Wj"1. By WI ~ W2, the second moment term in (4.10) satisfies
(4.10)
Since E(CI) ~ E(C2)' the two terms in (4.10) contribute in opposite directions and both V(CI) ~
V(C2) and V(CI) 2': V(C2) are possible depending on the distribution p("1).
If p("1) is concentrated toward max{l/wl. 1/w2}-i.e., the distribution of ~ is concentrated toward
O-then Cl and C2 are close to 0 with high probability. Since CI(t) ~ C2(t), in the degenerate case when
CI(t) = 0, t E R+, it is certainly possible to have
(4.11)
as desired in (4.7).
Let us consider the case when p("1) is concentrated toward 0, i.e., the distribution of ( is concen-
trated toward jl. Under such conditions of high cross traffic, CI(t), C2(t) > 0 with high probability and
we will make the approximation
Cj(t) = 1- Wj~(t).
Since 1 - Wj"1(t) = 1 - Wj(jl- ~(t)), we have
V(Cj) = wJV(O. (1.12)
That is, the variance of the packet loss rate is proportional to the variance of the cross traffic process
with constant of proportionality wJ.
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By WI ~ W2, we now have V(CI) ~ V(C2). Assumlng strict inequality WI > W2 between the two
service classes, we get
E(Cl) < E(c,), (4.13)
That is, the apparently "superior" service class 1 has a higher variance than service class 2 although
it still has a smaller mean packet loss rate. Returning back to the original question of whether (4.7)
can be achieved assuming WI > W2, we conclude that under high cross traffic conditions, CI < C2 but
al > a2, and Xl = (cI,al) and x2 = (q,a2) become incomparable.
4.2.3 Numerical Estimation
Although the closed forms of the mean and variance of Cj are, in general, difficult to obtain, their
numerical approximations are straightforward to compute assuming the distribution of the cross traffic
process {is well-behaved. For example, in the case of long-range dependent processes with finite mean
but infinite variance, accurately approximating E(Cj), V(Cj) will not be easy, requiring a large number
of terms in the expansion to adequately reflect the polynomlally decaying tail of the distribution.
Here, we will show the transition behavior (4.11), (4.13) as a function of mean cross traffic when




L max{1- w;(1' - k), OJ k! '
k=O
and similarly for the second moment E(cJ).
Figure 4.1 plots the estimated mean and variance values as a function of AR • We have used the
parameter set al = 0.7, a2 = 0.3, qI = q2 = 450 (thus giving WI> W2), J.L = 900, with AR ranging from
10 to 500. Since { is Poisson, E({) = V({) = AR . We observe that up until AR ~ 240 when E(cd = 0,
we have V(cd < V(C2), mainly due to the fact that V(CI) := 0 for most of the interval. However, after
AR > 200, approximately in tandem with E(CI) becoming positive, V(CI) > 0, and after AR > 250, we
have
V(c]) > V(c,)
as predicted by the analysis. Notice that the transition is fairly abrupt with V(CI) < V(C2) holding
mostly for the degenerate case when E(cd:= 0, Le., CI(t):= o.
4.2.4 Simulation Results
Set-up This section provides simulation results of noncooperative QoS provision network games,
confirmlng the transition behavior shown in Figure 4.1. We also show the dynamics of a system which
has both packet loss rate and end-to-end delay as components in the application QoS requirement
vectors.
We implement the network set-up described in Section 4.2.1 with n applications (grouped into





















Figure 4.1: Left: Estimated mean packet loss rate of 2-service class system as a function of cross traffic
variance ).R. Right: Estimated standard deviation of packet loss rate of 2-service class system as a
function of cross traffic variance.
given by a Poisson process with rate ,.\R. In keeping with the ATM framework, we assume fixerl-
size packets (i.e., cells) and we employ output-buffered switches. We implement a generic form of
weighted fair queueing achieving perfect isolatedness and conservation of work. We ignore effient
implementation considerations of WFQ, treating the processing cost at the switches as fixed. The
assumption of fixed-size packets simplifies the faithful rendering of service rates commensurate with
the weights a}, ... ,am'
We associate prices Pl,P2, ... ,Pm with the service classes, and applications incur a cost of AijPi
for sending a traffic volume of Aii tagged by service class identifier j E [1, mJ. Each application is
assigned a one-time budget of Bi, i E [1, n], sufficient for the simulation duration. We also assume
that assignments are of the type "aU in one bag." I.e., Aii E {D, A;} and L:i A;i = Ai. The selfishness
behavior of applications is modeled in the following way. Given application i's QoS requirement vector
8 i , the application seeks out a cheapest service cla.'ls j such that all its QoS requirements are satisfied.
That is, xi ::; (i and Pi is minimal. Thus, applications are assumed to assign a nonzero utility to
"money."
If no such service class j exists-i.e., Vj E [1, m], xi 1:. ei-then application i submits its traffic
to a service class j' that most closely meets its QoS requirements, however, paying a price of Pi' +6
where 6 > 0 is a bid parameter. The current price of service classes is continuously updated by the
system (realized by a computational market that monitors these events), with the new price pj set as
the maximum of the bids submitted in the previous round.
The price decrease mechanism is affected in the following way. Let Ai denote the set of application
indices i E [1, n] currently assigned to service class j E [1, m]. Let
. 1 '" .
X'= !A.I L. 6'.
J iEA}
(4.14)
That is, Xi = (x{, ... ,rl? is the average application QoS requirement vector of applications currently
assigned to class j. If Xi - xi> 0 and IIxi - xiII> 0 where 0 > ais a system parameter, then
pj {- max{pj - 6, O}.
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In other words, the system itself exerts a downward pressure on the price of a service class j if the QoS
rendered in the service class-Le., x3-is significantly better than the QoS required by the constituent
applications. Hence, if the system is underutilized, services are rendered at nominal prices or for free.
One may use a number of different norms II· II (we have used the sup norm) depending on the QoS
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Figure 4.2: Top row. Same packet 1055 requirement but different variance requirements. Left: Cell
loss trace shows inverted ordering where service class with least variance has highest cell loss rale.
Right: Corresponding traffic volume trace q,ll q2, Q3' Bottom TOW. Total order on both packet loss rate
and variance. Cell 1055 trace with similar reverse ordering phenomenon.
Effect of Burstiness Figure 4.2 shows the trace of two 3-application class/3-service class/2-
dimensional QoS vector systems where the components of the QoS vectors are packet loss rate and its
standard deviation, respectively.
In the first system, there are 15 applications grouped into three application classes of 5 applications
each, where the application class QoS vectors are given by (0.9,0.02), (0.9, 0.036), and (0.9,0.09). That
is, they all have the same packet loss rate bound 0.9 but different bounds on the standard deviation.
In the second system, the same situation holds except that the application class QoS vectors are
strictly ordered with values (0.83,0.021) < (0.86,0.036) < (0.9, 0.08). The service weights were set at
a1 = 0.2, a2 = 0.3, and 0:3 = 0.5. The application traffic demands Ai, i = 1,2, ... ,15 were set at
85 x 5, 49 x 5, and 46 x 5. The service rate was p, = 900 and the cross traffic rate was >..R = SOD.
The top row of Figure 4.2 shows the time evolution of packet loss rate in the three service classes
for the two systems (top-left and top-right) described above. In each case, we observe that the
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applications' bounds on packet loss rate are all satisfied. However, M predicted by the analysis, the
application with the most stringent QoS requirement-in both cMes requiring a standard deviation
bound of 0.02 and 0.021, respectively-ends up receiving the worst actual packet loss rate rendered
although they are still below the required packet loss rate thresholds.
The bottom row of Figure 4.2 shows the corresponding time evolutions of the traffic Msignments
to the three service clMses. We observe that after a transient period, applications settle into service
clMses where their QoS needs are met at leMt cost, and stay so thereafter. That is, the applications
have reached a NMh equilibrium which is also system optimal with respect to the resource allocation
problem defined in Section 2.
Degenerate Assignment Figure 4.3 shows the trace of a 2-application class/2-service class/2-
dimensional QoS vector system with service weights a1 = 0.4, a2 = 0.6. There were a total of 10
applications grouped into two application classes of 5 applications each, with application class QoS
requirements (0.7,0.01), (0.7,0.04). The traffic volume demands Ai, i = 1,2, ... ,10 were 40 x 5 and
140 x 5.
Figure 4.3 (left) shows that service class 1 has both a (ower packet loss rate and a lower packet
loss standard deviation than service class 2. However, this is only achieved because the packet loss
rate for service class 1 is zero or near zero---the degenerate case. Note that in spite of service elass 1
having a service weight of a1 := 0.4 < a2, due to the smaller traffic volume assigned to class 1, q1 < Q2,
the normalized service weight satisfies Wl > W2 thus explaining the 0 packet loss rate associated with
service class L
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Figure 4.3: Degenerate CMe where QoS delivered obeys the same order as that required by constituent
applications (0.7,0.01) < (0.7,0.04). First component is packet loss rate and second component is
variance. Left: Shows degenerate QoS rendered for service elMS 1 where packet loss rate and variance
are both O. Right: Corresponding traffic volume trace.
Packet Loss and End-to-end Delay Figure 4.4 shows the trace of a 3-application dass/3-service
elass/2-dimensional QoS vector system where the QoS vectors now consist of bounds on packet loss
rate and end-to-end delay. It 1s straightforward to verify that unlike in the case of packet loss variance,
end-to-end delay moves in the same direction as packet loss rate with respect to the effect of cross
traffic variance.
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The application QoS vectors are given by (0.2,0.8), (0.2, 2), and (0.2,7) where the flISt component is
packet loss rate. The service weights were set at Q1 = 0.6, 0:2 = 0.24, and 0':3 = 0.16. The traffic volume
demands of the 15 applications were 110 x 5, 48 X 5, and 42 X 5. The delay trace-Figure 4.4 (left)-
shows that the end-to-end delay requirements of the three applications are aU satisfied. Similarly
for the packet loss rate requirement as seen in Figure 4.4 (right). Unlike in the packet loss variance
case, however, a total ordering on the rendered QoS of the three service classes is clearly achieved as
expected. That is, Xl < x 2 < x 3 .
QoS Vooa.s ([,2, .8], [2, 2]. [.2. 7])
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Figure 4.4: 3-service class system with packet loss rate and delay as QoS indicators. Application QoS
requirements obey strict ordering (0.2,0.8) < (0.2,2) < (0.2,7). Left: Delay trace showing satisfactory
QoS rendered by the service classes. Right: Corresponding packet loss rate trace.
5 Structural Adaptation
5.1 Problem Statement
The network QoS provision problem defined in Section 2 is fundamentally a network resource allocation
problem, with noncooperativeness imparting additional dynamic structure, by imposing a constraint
on what configurations are considered stable. From a resource allocation point-of-view, it is clear that
the maximal total utility>. = Ei=l >.; (the trivial bound on the total utility U), in general, may not
be achieved by any assignment and similarly for U.
In fact, for system configurations where resources are heavily taxed, Nash equilibria may not exist
(see, e.g., Proposition 3.8) or be difficult to reach, and we are confronted with the potential problem of
the system oscillating and erratically switching states which can adversely affect the quality of service
rendered to a spectrum of service classeS.
Scenario 1 On one hand, this problem may be intrinsic in the sense that short of adding more
resources such as link capacity and buffer space to the system, the problem cannot be solved. Figure 5.1
shows the time trace of such a system which consists of 10 applications grouped into two application
classes-five each-with cell loss requirements of 0.01 and 0.1, respectively. It is a 2-service class system
with traffic volumes >'1, ... ,...\.10 , service rate J-l, service weights 0':1 > 0':2, and cross traffic rate >.NR set
at levels such that the assignment where the 5 applications with a O.OI-cellioss rate requirement go
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to service class 1 and the remaining 5 applications with the D.1-ceIlloss rate requirement go to service
class 2 is not sustainable in the long run.
Figure 5.1 (left) shows the price trace which exhibits an inflationary trend spumed by the compet-
itive bidding by the applications of the structurally scarse resources. Figure 5.1 (mlddle) depicts the
cell loss rate trace ofthe two service classes which show mean ceil loss rates that are below the required
levels 0.01 and 0.1, respectively. However, whereas in service class 1 the entire packet loss trace stays
strictly below 0.01, for service class 2, this is not the case, with the bound 0.1 being repeatedly violated
due to service class 2's structural deficiency at satisfying the QoS requirement of the O.l-ceIlIoss rate
application pool.
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Figure 5.1: Trace of2-service class system with taxed resources. Left: Inflationary price trend. Middle:
Delivered cell loss rate given application requirements 0.01 and 0.1. llight: Traffic volume trace ql, q2
assigned to the two service classes.
This, in turn, prompts some of the D.l-applications to migrate to "greener pastUf<lS" (service class
1), triggered by the selfish decision procedure described in Section 4.2.4. The departure of one or more
of the five applications8 has three side effects: one, the ceil loss rate Cl associated with service class 1
increases due to crowding; two, by the same token, the cell loss rate of service class 2 decreases due
to the diminished traffic volume q2 assigned to it; and three, the price P2 of service class 2 decreases
caused by the downward price adjustment mechanism described in Section 4.2.4.
Thus, shortly after migration, service class 2 looks attractive again since its new cell loss rate
satisfies the migrated D.l-cell loss rate applications and P2 < Pl' This leads to a reverse migration
back to service class 2, and when C2 sufficiently rises again, the cycle repeats. This cyclic migration
behavior is shown in Figure 5.1 (right) which depicts the traffic volumes ql, q2 assigned to the two
service classes as a function of time.
Assuming fixed resources, tItis structural overutilization can only be resolved by either one or more
applications departing the network-e.g., induced by budget constraints-or the background traffic
changing its characteristics such as a decline in intensity9.
Scenario 2 On the other hand, although still out of the control of applications, it may be possible
that the network is in possession of sufficient resources to accommodate the QoS requirements of
8The applications are independent of each other, executing a distributed update mechanism which, in general, leads
to asynchronous Lriggering of migrations, albeit lLighly correlated.
9Due to space limitations, simulation results that illustrate these effects aTe omitted.
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constituent applications, however, is wrongly configured for the demand characteristics at hand. Such
is the case, for example, when switches implement weighted fair queueing with service weights a =
(a1' 02, ... ,am)' What may be a structural problem for one set of weights a may not be a problem for
another set of weights a ' . Many packet switching disciplines are of such a (potentially) programmable
naLure, and in the context of WFQ, the question arises how the control should be affected. This
question is addressed next.
5.2 Service Weight Adaptation
5.2.1 An Example
Before we investigate adaptive strategies for changing a as a function of network state, let us illustrate
the potential benefit of changing a using a one-time intervention when it is warranted. Figure 5.2
shows the trace of a 3-service class system with 15 applications divided into three application classes
exhibiting cyclical behavior similar to the 2-service class system in Figure 5.1 during time interval
a :::; t :::; 250. Application packet loss requirements are 0.01, 0.05, and 0.2, respectively, for the three
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Figure 5.2: Overtaxed 3-service class system. Left: Cell loss trace shows decrease in C2 (but increase
in its variance) and increase in C3 at time t = 300. Middle: Traffic volume trace shows stability after
t = 300. Right: Service weights are changed at t = 300, increasing a2 and decreasing 03.
We observe that migration occurs between service classes 1 and 2, with the 0.05-cellloss rate appli-
cations migrating back and forth due to reasons analogous to the 2-service class system of Figure 5.1.
A distinguishing factor is the presence of 0.2-cellloss rate applications who have settled into service
class 3, being happily stationary receiving an actual cell loss rate of 0.1 which is significantly lower
than needed.
An impartial network manager, having control over 01, 0:2, 0:3, upon observing this phenomenon
for a period, may conclude that service class 2 is overutilized while class 3 is underutillzed and decide
to shift some of the weight in 0:3 to a2, expecting to affect an improvement. That is, the updated
service weights are set to
where 0 < € :::; 0;3 is an adjustment parameter.
29
Indeed, precisely this is carried out at time t = 300 with E = 0.015, yielding a = (0.6, 0.315, 0.085),
and its effects are captured in Figure 5.2. We observe that the mean packet loss rate of service class 2
has dropped-its variance, however, has increased as predicted by the analysis in Section 4.2.2-and
it has dropped sufficiently to offset the increased variance, resulting in satisfied O.OS-applications with
no further incentive to migrate. The mean cell loss rate of service class 3, as expected, has increased.
However, its new of value of 0.16 is still lower than the 0.2 requirement, and thus the exchange has
resulted in a net increase in total utility-in our case, even in the sense of Pareto since step utility
functions are used.
5.2.2 Adaptive Weight Control
The first step in formulating an adaptive control algorithm Q that acts on 0:, 0:' +- 0(0:), is to
quantitatively capture whether a service class is under- or over-utilized. Note that something akin
to this has already been done in Section 4.2.4 in conjunction with formulating the downward price
adjustment mechanism. We defined the vector Xi = (xL ... ,>df (see (iJ..14) of Section 4.2.4) to be
the component-wise average of the application QoS vectors currently assigned to service class j. Since
o may act even if Xi - xi -; 0 where xi is the vector of actual QoS rendered by service class j, we
will no longer use the sup norm to measure their difference.
Let xi(t) be the local time average of xi(t) at time t with memory T > O. That is,
. 1 '";<3(,) = - L-
T
t-T<t'$t
Similarly for Xi(t). We will drop the Lime index t for notational clarity. Since varying 0: represents
structural changes above and beyond what application behavior can achieve through competitive
interaction, care should be taken not to trigger such changes on the basis of short-term, spurious
effects which can render the system unstable. T allows us to control the degree of responsiveness.
Let
(5.1)
and let hi E [l,s] be a QoS vector component index that satisfies (5.1). It may be that d(X-i,xi ) < 0,
and one can choose to define d in a number of different ways depending on what the particular
objectives are. Our definition takes a conservative side. If d(X], xi) 2:: ,. for some threshold 1''' > 0,
then we may consider service class j to be underutilized, and vice versa. Let
where '* ~ ,., and let j_ E R- satisfy
That is, R+ represents the set of underutilized service classes, and j_ represents the most overutilized
service class. If either R+ or R- is empty, no action is taken by Q.
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Based upon the example discussed above, we would like to increase aj_ and decrease aj for
some maximal element j E R+. However, this is not necessarily correct. Since the hj_ 'th QoS
vector component may represent a bound on a "variance-related measure" (e.g., delay jitter), from
Section 4.2.2, we know that increasing o.i_ would actually make the variance experienced by service
class j_ even worselO • Thus, in this case, aj_ would need to be decreased. Since the goal is to
eqllilibriate imbalances between service classes in R- and R+, this implies that we need to find a
maximal element j E R+ with respect to d(Xj,xi ) such that it does not benefit from an increase in
o.j.
Let V: [1,sJ -I- {0,1} be an indicator function such that V(r) = 1 iffr is a variance-related QoS
vector component index. We will assume that such a dual classfication is possible. Let j+ E R+ satisfy
That is, j+ is a maximally underutilized service class such that the dominating (with respect to the
definition of d(-, -)) QoS vector component index hi+ has the same property as hj __ If there is none,
we will let j+ be the minimal element in R+ with respect to d(Xi , x.i).
Now we are ready to state the control law Q. Let c = min{ (*, aj+ } where {'" > 0 is an adjustment
parameter. Then
jf j E [1, m] \ {j+, j_},
ifj=j_,
ifj=j+.
Thus the indicator function V is also used in the selection of the sign of c, subtracting ( from o.j_ if
the dominating QoS vector component hi_ is variance-related, and adding f to o.j_ if it is not. It is
straightforward to check that Q preserves EiE[l,m] aj = 1 and aj ~ 0, j E [1, m].
At every update, a pair of maximal imbalances are reduced-I.e., brought closer-by an amount
affected by f. For stationary systems with '1" -'1" > 0 where stationarity is with respect to Xi and xi
(itself a function of T), if f* is sufficiently small, then Q will typically converge after a finite number
of steps. That is, for some T > 0,
a(t + T) = a(T), t 2 o.
The dynamics of Q may be analyzed using techniques in [34].
Figure 5.3 shows the dynamics of a system under the action of Q. It is a 3-service class system
with the same system configuration as in Figure 5.2 except that the adaptive control Q is now active.
Additional parameter settings of interest are T = 10, '1* = '1_ = 0.005, and (" = 0.001. We observe
that a: undergoes changes at t = 76 and t = 121, at both times increasing 0.2 at the expense of Ct3.
The imbalance reduction at t = 76 has a positive effect, decreasing service class 2's ceUloss rate and
quenching the migration when contrasted with the trace shown in Figure 5.2. However, the adjustment
proves to be insufficient in the long run registering yet another imbalance at time t = 120 which triggers
laThe degenerat.e case need not be separat.ely considered since if service class i- has 0 or dose to 0 variance 10 begin
with, t.hen it. would most likely not have been chosen to be improved.
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a further correction. The cause of the two triggering events can be gleamed from Figure 5.3 (bottom
row, left) which depicts traces of xi (rendered cell loss rate) and Xi (desired application ceil loss rate)
for service class j = 2 only. At t = 76 and t = 121, x2 crosses X2 , exceeding the latter, and this, in
turn, causes the corrective action by 9 reducing the imbalance between utilizations in service class
2 and 3 whose trade-off is clearly beneficial given that :C stays well above x3 even after the weight
adjustments. The system, having been configured to possess a Nash equilibrium for some service
weight vector 0:, and being stationary over the simulation interval, settles down to a steady state
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Figure 5.3: Overtaxed 3·service class system. Top row. Left: Ceil loss trace. Right: Traffic volume
trace exhibits stability after initial transition phase. Bottom row. Left: xi (rendered ceil loss rate) vs.
Xi (desired application ceil loss rate) for service class j = 2 only. Right: Service weight trace showing
changes at t = 76,121.
6 Conclusion
We have presented a study of the quality of service prOVlSlon problem in noncooperative network
environments where applications or users are assumed to behave selfisWy. Our framework and its
conclusions are best suited-but not exclusively so-for best-effort traffic environments where the
network is not required to provide stringent QoS guarantees which can only be accomplished currently
by employing conservative resource reservations. Rather, service classes with differentiated QoS levels
matching the needs of constituent applications are induced by the latter's selfish interactions, providing
reasonably stable QoS levels as a function of network state.
We have formulated a noncooperative QoS provision model and given a comprehensive analysis
of its properties. We have shown that Nash equilibria-which correspond to stable fixed points in
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noncooperative games-need not he system optimal nor Pareto, in fact, for certain QoS provlSlon
systems, Nash equilibria need not even exist. We have given a complete characterization of Nash
equilibria and the subset of those that are also system optimal. We have shown that the latter is
related to the Pareto optimality of a certain normal form derived from the Nash configuration. For
"resource-plentiful" systems, we have shown that Nash, Pareto, and system optima all coincide, and
moreover, convergence is monotone and fast if a form of asynchronous self-optimization is used.
We have extended the analysis to QoS provision systems with multi-dimensional QoS vectors
containing both mean- and variance-related QoS measures. We have shown that the main results
carryover If a uniformity assumption is placed either on application preference thresholds or on QoS
vector functions. We have also looked at the impact of multiple QoS measures on the characteristics of
induced QoS levels actually rendered by the service classes. We have shown that under bursty traffic
conditions, it is impossible for a service class to deliver superior QoS in both mcan- and variance-
related QoS measures (e.g., mean delay and jitter) vis-a.-vis some other service class if weighted fair
queueing or other general processor sharing (GPS)-related packet scheduling discipline is used.
Lastly, whereas the aforementioned results dealt with questions concerning properties of system
states as determined by the interaction of selfish applications or users, we have also investigated the
question of what the system, if anything, can do to enhance network QoS provision performance
without adversely affecting individual applications. We have formulated an adaptive service weight
control algorithm for GPS-based routers and shown its effectiveness at reducing imbalances between
service class utilizations thus increasing total system utility. However, the system-initiated reshuffling
of resources is done in such a way so that system utility is improved without sacrificing the utility of
individual applications-a form of Pareto optimization.
Current work is directed in two main avenues, one, in the extension of the game-theoretic analysis
to arbitrary monotone utility functions which requires further development of analytical tools and
techniques, and second, in the study of WAN-scale internetworked systems-a prime target being the
realization of such QoS provision systems on the Internet-where, from a technical perspective, the
interaction among routers or switches introduces new complexities and a slew of challenging problems.
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